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DISAGGREGATING U.S. INTERESTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
PETER J. SPIRO*
I
INTRODUCTION
After decades on the margins, international law is becoming a prominent force in
virtually every area of domestic law. Teaching subjects such as procedure, bankruptcy, antitrust law, tax, and family law is increasingly difficult without some reference to international settings, instruments, and cases. Globalization would hardly allow otherwise. The growing density of transnational contacts requires transnational
solutions. To the extent that individuals, families, corporations, and judicial proceedings inhabit transnational spaces, some regulation will naturally occur somewhere
other than at the national level. The trajectory toward a higher incidence of such
straddling contexts and corresponding transnational institutional responses is giving
the lie to the very category of “domestic” law. Nearly all of today’s law school
graduates will at some point in their careers encounter issues of international law and
policy. In the legal academy, important scholarship is focusing on the peculiar challenges posed by transnational settings.
Constitutional law has proved something of a laggard in this trend. For the most
part, constitutional law remains an insular affair, or at least it has been so perceived.
This is a product of both the nature and the culture of constitutional law. Constitutional law has confronted straddling contexts, but the presentation of constitutional
law questions tends to elude the necessity of coordination with other states and international actors, at least as presented in particular cases. The mechanics of constitutional law, constrained and legitimated by an indigenous instrument and executed by
judicial institutions with no operational responsibilities, have trouble processing the
external inputs.
This in turn has cemented a culture of constitutional law fiercely resistant to such
inputs. The Constitution is so central to American identity that any concession of external constitutional constraints may constitute a threat to national self-determination.
This explains the relative intensity of objections to international norms and institutions
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thought to compromise constitutional discretion, at least in the absence of countervailing interests. Sovereignty becomes the bulwark of constitutional autonomy.
But autonomy may no longer present a sustainable strategy, in constitutional law
or in any other area. This essay first adapts the tools of International Relations (IR)
theory to the question of how international law might be incorporated into U.S. law,
the putative global dominance of the United States notwithstanding. IR theory has informed an important strain of recent international law scholarship.1 It provides a useful frame for situating international law as a matter of institutional interactions rather
than a matter of doctrine. “By situating legal rules and institutions in their political
context, IR helps to reduce the abstraction and self-contained character of doctrinal
analysis and to channel normative idealism in effective directions.”2 It is not typically
deployed to explain internal state dynamics salient to the initial incorporation of international law, focusing more on domestic politics as an independent variable.3 Nor has
IR theory been prominently deployed to explain or to project the relationship of the
United States to international law. This Article describes how discrete elements of the
United States, including private actors and disaggregated governmental components
beyond the traditional foreign policy apparatus, may be developing an institutional interest in the acceptance of international regimes. This Article thus suggests a future in
which international law is absorbed into U.S. law not because it is good—although it
may well be that, too—but because rational institutional action will pull in that direction.
II
BRINGING IR THEORY HOME
IR theory has until recently been about states, their interests, and their power. Departures from the once-dominant Realist school have recognized the salience of nonstate actors, but only to the extent that they either exercise political power within domestic structures (Liberal IR theory) or seek to persuade states to adhere to particular
norms (Constructivist IR theory). State action remains the ultimate unit of analysis in
all three approaches, which misses the independent consequentiality of non-state action.4 While Constructivist approaches recognize that non-state actors operate on a
transnational basis, they attribute non-state influence to the force of ideas rather than
to power. This Article will attempt to marry Constructivist foregrounding of transna-

1. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993).
2. Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing
Atrocities in International Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 362 (1999).
3. See Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 369 (1998) (noting use of IR by international
legal scholars “to diagnose substantive problems and frame better legal solutions, to explain the structure or
function of particular international legal rules or institutions, and to reconceptualize or reframe particular institutions or international law generally”).
4. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International Law, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
567, 582-86 (2000) (highlighting IR’s failure to account for non-state actors).
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tional actors with Liberal premises of institutional self-interest and domestic power
politics.
International law has long suffered a sort of ontological challenge among political
scientists as to whether it really qualifies as “law” at all. This difficulty dates to
Austinian notions of law and power, under which rules qualify as law only when they
are enforced by superior institutions able to back commands with the legitimatized use
of violence.5 The system of rules among nation-states did not fit with this pyramidal
conception of law. States were not subject to command from above. The enforcement
model of the law of nations, as it was known, was a horizontal one among formal
equals. Of course, formal equality did not translate into equality on the ground. To
the political scientists of the mid-twentieth century, international law thinly masked
power relationships and state interests. The Realist school of IR theory was particularly devastating in its critique of international law as lacking consequence. Posing an
anarchic system of interstate relations, definitionally counterposed to one governed by
the rule of law, the Realists framed a world in which rational self-interest and geopolitical capacities, not law, explained the global dynamic.6
In fact, Realism did a good job of explaining the Cold War world. The Cold War
marked the zenith of state-centered power. It was a context in which studying the
state, to the exclusion of all other actors, comported with power realities. The domination and antagonism of the two superpowers, moreover, made it almost impossible
to establish a broadly effective regime of international norms, at least not one that significantly constrained state discretion. The superpowers rejected norms inconsistent
with their interests, and nobody else could do anything about it. This created a glaring
gap between the formal instruments of what purported to be the new, post-WorldWar-II dawn of international law—the United Nations Charter and the UN Declaration on Human Rights, for instance—and the actual practices of states. International
law appeared to be a system of mere paper guarantees, an epiphenomenon of interstate
relations. States pursued perceived self-interest, whether or not it complied with international law. States did what they could get away with.
Hence the traction of Realist approaches in the latter half of the twentieth century
and the corresponding poverty of norm-driven or positivist models. On such issues as
the use of force and human rights the law, it was power that determined state action.
Realism also enjoyed intuitive analytical appeal to the extent that it worked from notions of self-interest rather than obligation. In the absence of systematic enforcement
and in the face of high stakes, it was not easy to explain why states would or should
observe rules that competitors were flouting, at least not where the observance of such
rules would diminish relative strength.

5. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 1-31 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1954) (rejecting characterization of international law as such).
6. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 278 (3rd ed. 1960) (stressing problems
of decentralized character of international law; “[w]here there is neither community of interest nor balance of
power, there is no international law”). The characterization of international law as such was also questioned by
legal theorists. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 217 (2d ed. 1994) (“[I]f . . . the rules of international law are not ‘binding,’ it is surely indefensible to take seriously their classifications as law; for however
tolerant the modes of common speech may be, this is too great a difference to be overlooked.”).
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Realism faces a more difficult challenge processing the contemporary realities of
late-modern world politics. It is hard now to deny the consequentiality of international norms. The number and scope of international instruments; the attention that
states and others direct to their negotiation, refinement, and application; and the
prominence of international regimes and institutions in important policy debates all
point to an enhanced position for international law.7 Realism might be able to explain
some of this activity. In the security context, for instance, state power and selfinterest would explain non-proliferation regimes, especially those that privilege more
powerful states. In such cases, law may still be more of an indicator rather than a
driver.
But there are other new global issues in which Realism comes up short, human
rights presenting the most obvious case. Human rights regimes have nothing to do
with material reciprocal benefits. One country’s refraining from torturing its own citizens does not pose a direct benefit to other countries. It is not clear why, from a Realist perspective, states would undertake human rights commitments and then live up to
them, especially if other states were unwilling to marshal significant resources in their
universal enforcement. It is for this reason that Realists may be cheap in conceding
that human rights regimes have in fact deepened. To the extent that human rights regimes now govern state behavior with no correlation to power relationships, traditional Realist conceptions of international relations are undermined.
Hence the emergence of strong competing schools of International Relations theory. Liberal international relations theorists break open the “black box” of the state to
allow the salience of domestic political actors. In this scheme, international relations
becomes a two-stage process in which foreign policy outcomes are explained by the
pursuit of state preferences, as determined through domestic politics and as constrained by strategic interactions with other states.8 In a more radical break from the
Realists, Constructivist IR theorists assert the consequentiality of ideas, as pressed by
norm entrepreneurs in transnational political spaces.9 In this view, international relations adds up to more than the sum of rational interests.
It is not my purpose here to undertake anything more than a crude primer of international relations theories; nor do I offer a freestanding alternative. It does seem possible, however, to extract some utility from all three major strands of IR theory. Realism offers the logic of self-interested behavior and the inevitability of relationships
defined by power. But Realism fails to recognize power outside of the state. Indeed it
refuses to acknowledge power outside of the traditional foreign policy apparatus of
states. Constructivist IR theorists highlight the salience of other actors, especially

7. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 186-87 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 544 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathyrn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,
52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998).
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transnational social movements,10 but only insofar as they are propagators of new
ideas. Liberal theorists, meanwhile, understand that “individuals and private groups”11
are political actors of consequence to the development and effectiveness of international regimes, but only so long as they are enclosed within the confines of “domestic
society” and work at the international level only through their allocated state agents:
the possibility of their transnationality goes unacknowledged. As much as Realism,
Liberal IR reifies the territorial state and hews to the primacy of states on the international scene. Even when states act in a disaggregated manner—that is, through component units—they are characterized as maintaining unitary preferences.
As yet unrepresented among major IR strains is a model that centers the powers
and interests, as opposed to the principles, of transnational non-state actors. Such a
model would take the rational-actor, materialist premises of Liberal IR theory and
broaden it to include the Constructivist focus on transnational social movements as
well as on corporations and subnational authorities. The model abandons Liberalism’s
state-delimited conception of “society” and Constructivism’s elevation of norms over
material interests. It rejects the essentialization of the state in which all IR theory continues to be grounded, arguing that transnational non-state activity can be of independent consequence, whether or not it affects state behavior. The resulting dynamic,
which might run under the label liberal transnationalism, would highlight the rational
interests and capacities of various institutions in charting global developments. One
might retain the billiard ball metaphor for international relations12 —in which states
are conceived as acting on each other with a predictability approaching the laws of
physics—by extending actor status to entities other than states. To the extent that the
balls are of variable mass, perhaps the cosmos supplies the more useful image.
The result may not lend itself to the refined modeling of state interaction.13 Alone,
states present a small universe of isomorphic entities, mostly working along the same
metrics of interest and power (both ultimately relating to military and economic might
and the control of persons and territory). The new actors of international relations, by
contrast, project different capacities with differing objectives, and their interactions
are complex, especially insofar as states no longer serve a dominant channeling function. Explaining incentive structures beyond state-to-state interactions, a model recognizing the interests and power of non-state actors—both independently and as determinants of state power—might complement normative justifications for
participation in international legal regimes. The model, in other words, supplies a
polycentric, interest-based explanation of how international law comes home, to stand

10. See MARGARET KECK & KATHYRN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ch. I (1998) (describing impact of transnational advocacy networks on state behavior).
11. Moravcsik, supra note 8, at 519.
12. See ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 19-24
(1962) (claiming “Billiard Ball” model . . . leaves no room for non corporate actors other than nation state”).
13. The result notably precludes use of 2x2 matrix games (such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma) that tend to
dominate Realist/rational-choice analyses of international law. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (making extensive use of game theoretic
models involving interactions between two states only).
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alongside those which assert or assume that international law should triumph as an inherent good.
III
THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF THE UNITED STATES
Incorporating institutional power and self-interest at levels other than the state,
this model could predict the more complete assimilation of the United States into the
system of international norms. Unlike most other developed countries, the United
States has assumed a skeptical, sometimes openly hostile posture to international law
and institutions.14 The United States assumes an à la carte model of international law,
asserting its prerogative to elect those regimes in which it will participate.15 In some
cases this approach drives non-participation in important but discretionary international regimes, as with the Kyoto accords on climate change and the establishment of
an International Criminal Court. In other cases, the approach results in noncompliance with a mandatory norm, that is, one from which a state may not opt out, as
with the continuing use of capital punishment against juvenile offenders and other
practices implicating human rights norms.16 As the sole superpower, Realists would
expect this non-participation and non-compliance when regimes do not further U.S.
self-interest. Some elements of the Bush Administration clearly work from these sorts
of “might makes right” assumptions. The United States, the argument runs, can and
should eschew international norms contrary to its national interest.
It is possible that absorption will not occur, and that the United States will successfully resist the imposition of international norms not consistent with its interests
and continue to act unilaterally. Empire stands as an alternate basis of global governance going forward, with a hegemonic United States dictating international standards
rather than submitting to them.17 To the extent, however, that the United States consents to regimes not of its devising and inconsistent with its interests and preferences,
some other explanation would be required.
This question is most starkly presented in the context of constitutional law. Constitutional law categorically implicates supreme law. It is constitutive of the legal system. In the case of the United States, it is arguably constitutive of the community.

14. See, e.g., Stanley Hoffman, The High and the Mighty: Bush’s National Security Strategy and the New
American Hubris, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 13, 2003, at 28.
15. See Thom Shanker, White House Says US Is Not a Loner, Just Choosy, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2001, at
A1 (quoting Bush Administration characterization of “a la carte multilateralism” in which treaty obligations are
assessed on a case-by-case basis against American national interests).
16. Non-compliance may also result when the United States violates an obligation to which it has consented. Much of the IR literature considers this kind of compliance with international norms. See., e.g., Abram
Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175 (1993). Compliance in this sense is
less interesting in the U.S. context insofar as the United States has for the most part been careful to limit its
formal international obligations in ways to maximize compliance with them at the same time that it has aggressively rejected some norms enjoying near-universal international support. In projecting the possibility of participation and compliance, this Article confronts the possibility that international regimes will be imposed on
the United States and constrain its freedom of action—that is, it considers how international law will emerge as
a constraint on U.S. decisionmaking even in the absence of consent.
17. See, e.g., The Revival of Empire, 17 ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 34 (2003).
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Absent any other metric for membership, a standard liberal argument runs, it is constitutional faith that binds Americans together. In Michael Walzer’s conception, “If the
manyness of America is cultural, its oneness is political . . . .”18 To tether constitutional law to some other source of law is to demote it so that it is no longer supreme.
The proposition itself appears self-contradictory: if the Constitution is supreme, then
to bend it to other law is unconstitutional. It presents more than just a doctrinal deadend. If the Constitution does define what it means to be an American, then to cede its
interpretation to another body of law is to cede the very terms of the national identity.
This perhaps explains why “sovereignty” has become so effective a political and
even intellectual rallying call in the United States as compared to its weak resonance
in Europe and elsewhere.19 Once sovereignty is surrendered, America enjoys no other
organic support. It also explains the intensity of the debate over the appropriate place
of international law as a part of U.S. law. There is near-universal agreement that the
Constitution stands supreme, in the sense that international law can never be played as
a trump.20 The debate has concerned whether international law can be used as an interpretive tool of constitutional law: that is, whether international law can be recognized as a secondary source in defining constitutional norms. Even though as framed
this poses no frontal challenge to constitutional supremacy, the issue has provoked
heated controversy in the courts and in the academy.21 To the extent the question of
interpretive relevance presents a possible wedge for the elevation of international
norms above constitutional ones, this first-round contest is a crucial one.
Players in this debate mostly assume that U.S. acceptance of international law is a
matter of choice. My purpose here is to suggest that the choice may become increasingly constrained as the costs of non-participation and non-conformity increase for
and are increased by various actors within and outside the state. Pressures from multiple quarters will build on disaggregated components of the United States to submit to
various international regimes. These pressures will progressively limit opt-out possibilities. This will be true in the constitutional realm as in others. There will likely
come a point at which domestic constitutional law is effectively, if not formally, subordinated to international law.
The proposition might be advanced under a Constructivist or Liberal IR analysis.
Constructivism would highlight the influence of transnational activism on U.S. practices, making the shift from what were once characterized as “public interest groups”
acting within national parameters to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) acting
across national borders. Transnational NGOs may act on any state, including the
18. MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN AMERICAN 29 (1996).
19. See Robert O. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States, 40
COMMON MARKET STUD. 743 (2002); Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, FOR. AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9;
cf. Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527, 542 (2003) (suggesting that “sovereignty in American law is intimately bound up with the basically procedural nature of our constitutional commitments.”)
20. See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999,
1999-2000 (2003) (describing consensus supporting constitutional supremacy).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 69-74; see, e.g., Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 (2004) (with contributions by Harold Hongju Koh, Roger Alford, Michael
Ramsey, Gerald Neuman, and Alexander Aleinikoff).
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United States. Constructivists would highlight the role of ideas in persuading states to
accede to international regimes and press them on others. The solidification of these
regimes would in turn define the parameters of legitimacy for states. In this sense, international regimes construct (hence the tag for this brand of IR) what it takes to be a
state, and states are socialized by those regimes.22 Insofar as those parameters are defined in legal terms, states will be drawn into compliance with international law. In
the U.S. case, the analysis would assert the possibility that participation with various
international regimes will be pressed by transnational NGOs, directly and through
other states, and that U.S. interaction with other states and international organizations
will draw it to participation in an iterative normative dynamic.23 As a state, the U.S.
will have to present itself in terms defined by other states.
Constructivism breaks down the wall between domestic and international politics.
Unlike other IR theories, Constructivism accounts for the fact of globalization. But
Constructivism does not seem well equipped to explain exactly what it will take to
bring a behemoth such as the United States to heel. To the extent that Constructivism
recognizes power, it is in the form of state power. As for socialization, Constructivism does not demonstrate how the bully is socialized when he can afford not to be. It
is not clear how the United States will perceive its legitimacy to be defined or diminished by the standards of other states, international institutions, or international norms.
Many in the United States seem quite content to establish legitimacy in contrast to
rather than consistency with external phenomena. The United States is not among
those states that “are keenly aware of the approval of other states,”24 nor would the label “rogue state” give many Americans much pause.25 The well-established tradition
of American exceptionalism makes it a hard case for the Constructivists.
22. This element of constructivism figures centrally in norm-driven International Legal Process theory.
See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 7, at 27; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2650-51 (1997).
23. See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 643 (1998) (systematizing international “interactions” as the first step to incorporation of international law).
24. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC
CHANGES 1, 38 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) (highlighting socialization as driving compliance with human
rights norms).
25. See, e.g., CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF
GOOD INTENTIONS (2003); Thomas L. Friedman, Noblesse Oblige, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2001, at A19 (observing that “America is referred to as a ‘rogue state’ in Europe as often as Iraq”). Nor would the assertion that
“connection to the rest of the world and the political ability to be an actor in it are more important than any tangible benefits in explaining compliance with international regulatory agreements,” CHAYES & CHAYES, supra
note 7, at 27, appear to apply to U.S. participation in such regimes. Recent events relating to U.S. mistreatment
of detainees in Iraq might support the Constructivist socialization thesis as applied to the United States. Both
U.S. government officials and the American public were deeply embarrassed by the Abu Ghraib prison episode;
one might argue that compliance with international law norms against torture were thus evidenced to constitute
an element of America’s identity as a state. On the other hand, one could also ascribe the shame to indigenous
norms against such conduct; that, in other words, Americans were embarrassed by the events because they were
inconsistent not with international norms but with national ones. A presidential memo requiring the humane
treatment of detainees notwithstanding the non-application of the Geneva Conventions supports either interpretation. See Prisoner Abuse Bush Order, Feb. 7, 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A61651-2004Jun22.html (“Of course, our values as a nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such
treatment.”).
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From a Liberal IR perspective, two possible pathways might point to greater U.S.
submission to international regimes. The first would depend on the willingness of
other states to press compliance with international law as a matter of state-to-state relations. Unlike Realism, which has difficulty processing the assertion of something
like a human rights agenda, Liberal IR theorists can explain this willingness in terms
of the domestic politics of those states. A new European agenda centering international law may be driven by domestic European political interests. Once adopted as a
matter of state policy, it is not conceptually difficult to play out the mechanisms by
which international norms might be imposed on the United States. To the extent that
other states have something of interest to the United States, international law will be
injected into the bargaining mix. Depending on the intensity with which international
law compliance were pressed by another state and the bargaining power of that state,
the United States would incur costs from continued non-compliance. But other states
would need to marshal substantial leverage over the United States and be willing to
incur costs in pressing the United States to change its posture. In some contexts this
might work, where the leverage is high and costs low. An example would be with respect to the application of the death penalty to persons whose extradition is sought by
the United States; other states can extract U.S. undertakings at little cost, and their
leverage is complete. But these contexts present the exception. The European response to the Iraq invasion supplies a counter-example. Even though some powerful
European states considered the U.S. invasion to comprise a serious breach of international law, their leverage was insufficient to enforce that position against the United
States.
IV
NEW CAUSAL PATHWAYS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
More promisingly, Liberal IR theorists would also consider the interests of domestic U.S. groups in particular international regimes as drivers of participation in those
regimes. Liberal theorists can readily explain U.S. adherence to free trade regimes,
given the strong U.S. corporate support for such regimes. But Liberal IR would consider this support in mercantilist terms. In this approach, U.S. corporations (and other
groups supporting free trade) determine the “preference” of the United States. The
source of that preference is assumed to be indigenous, that is, not impacted by politics
beyond the water’s edge. As Andrew Moravcsik writes, preferences are “causally independent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific interstate
political actions.”26 Liberal IR also gives rise to an aggregated national position in relation to other nations. The state remains the basic unit of international relations, notwithstanding the Liberal recognition of disaggregated central government actors. In
Liberal IR theory, the state continues to be a box, albeit one that has become transparent.
Liberal IR theory could be deployed to chart the more complete assimilation of the
United States into international institutions. Almost all international regimes can now
26. Moravcsik, supra note 8, at 519.
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be paired with some domestic U.S. constituency. In the Liberal view, U.S. accession
would be expected when that constituency had an interest sufficiently intense to warrant pursuing participation in an international regime and domestic political power
sufficient to secure that objective. Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change,
for example, would be expected at the point when environmentalists were in a position, through the domestic political process, to garner the votes and contributions necessary to secure legislative and executive action. Likewise for human rights agreements, especially those (such as the conventions on race and gender discrimination)
that have self-interested constituencies who might at some point have sufficient material incentive and wield sufficient power to secure accession.
But Liberal IR theory would seem to miss important additional causal pathways
that may point to the more complete participation of the United States in international
regimes.27 The incompleteness of the Liberal IR account can be pinned to two core
assumptions: (1) that state preferences are generated by domestic politics insulated
from outside forces, and (2) that international relations is solely comprised of government-to-government interactions, rather than a more polycentric process in which
non-state actors may engage in consequential norms activity even where states are not
engaged.
On both counts, the more theoretically challenging “disaggregation” is taking
place outside of the realm of central governments. No doubt the state is disaggregating, in the sense that components of the federal government are now directly involved in international relations activity. But society is disaggregating as well, so that
it is more difficult to identify groups or corporations (or even individuals) as discretely “American.” Although corporations and the organs of civil society once functioned for the most part within the parameters of particular states, they now represent
partially distinct transnational identities and enjoy autonomous power. As they dissagregate from the state, these actors can mobilize transnationally to advance international regimes, both by pressuring state actors and by adopting those regimes into their
own practices. In the case of the United States, disaggregation creates more effective
alternatives to targeting a superpower. Although action against the United States as a
whole would in most cases implicate formidable costs, discrete components may be
vulnerable to transnational mobilization.
A. Transnational Pressure Points
The transnationality of social movements and corporations, first of all, changes the
nature of their power and what they represent. Non-state actors apply leverage against
governmental decisionmakers. This leverage can be applied directly, under a standard
pressure-group model. Political actors respond to organizational power that can command votes, favorable media play, and money. But transnational dynamics open up

27. And indeed the leading exponent of Liberal IR theory has implicitly predicted that the United States
will not accede to multilateral human rights conventions, barring a major restructuring of the U.S. political system and decline in its unilateral power. See Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT 345 (Stewart Patrick &
Shepard Forman eds., 2002).
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indirect channels of influence that enhance domestic political power and extend domestic political power to non-domestic groups. To the extent that Amnesty International or Greenpeace has power within U.S. political structures, for example, it is not
fully measured by the length of their U.S. membership rosters. Likewise, the influence of the foreign-based multinationals is not dependent on the size or existence of
U.S. subsidiaries.
Because they operate transnationally, these groups can pursue avenues of influence outside of domestic political structures that will enlarge their powers within those
structures. They will be in a position to enlist other states to advance their agendas.
Constructivists describe a “boomerang” effect in which domestic social movements
work with transnational partners to enlist other states and international organizations
to pressure their own governments (human rights activity in Latin American providing
a paradigmatic example).28 The U.S. elements of these transnational networks can
themselves undertake parallel efforts in foreign and international institutional settings
to bolster their domestic political undertakings. A U.S.-based group such as Human
Rights Watch will work to enlist other states to influence U.S. human rights practices.29
In pressuring the United States, that strategy will make a difference, at least at the
margins. When U.S. action depends on some level or form of multilateral support,
and that support is politically controversial in other states, transnational NGO activity
can tip the balance. One might suppose, for instance, that the United Kingdom would
not support application beyond Iraq of the Bush Administration’s preemption doctrine; that British non-support was generated in part by transnational activists (including American ones); and that the United States would not proceed with additional
military incursions without British participation. Insofar as U.S. elements in the
transnational political coalition contributed to British decisionmaking, those elements
secured through transnational channels what they could not secure through ordinary
domestic ones.
More subversive of both Constructivist and Liberal IR models are efforts by transnational social movements to advance international law-related agendas by pressuring
corporate actors on the expectation that they will in turn work to secure appropriate

28. See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 10, at 13.
29. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, Show Trials Are Not the Solution to Saddam’s Heinous Reign, GLOBE & MAIL
(Canada), July 18, 2003, at A13 (Human Rights Watch executive director calling on Canada to oppose
proposed war crimes trials for former Iraqi officials); James Ross, What Tony Blair Must Say in Washington,
THE GUARDIAN/OBSERVER ONLINE, July 13, 2003, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/
story/0,6903,997066,00.html (New York-based counsel to Human Rights Watch calling on British Prime
Minister Tony Blair to press Bush Administration on its treatment of terror suspects); Kenneth Roth, Allies’
Postwar Panic Puts Justice in Doubt, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 23, 2003, at 6 (calling on European
governments to oppose blanket U.S.-approved exemption for U.S. peacekeepers from jurisdiction of new
International Criminal Court); Kenneth Roth, Fight the Good Fight: Before Joining the US in a War on Iraq,
Blair Must Lay down the Law on Key Human Rights Principles, GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2002, at 8 (calling on
Blair to insist on non-use of cluster bombs as a condition for British participation in the invasion of Iraq). An
example of such NGO activity (although as yet not successfully applied against the United States) is the Ottawa
process that resulted in the land mines treaty. See Raymond Bonner, How a Group of Outsiders Moved Nations
to Ban Land Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1997, at A5 (describing the process by which NGOs enlisted the
support of foreign government officials to spearhead the campaign for a multilateral ban).
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governmental action. In this model, NGOs mobilize (or threaten to mobilize) the buying power of sympathetic consumers. Target companies may sometimes be singled
out because of their identification with a particular country whose conduct the NGO
seeks to change, entangling them, in effect, as innocent bystanders. The boycott of
Beaujolais wine in the face of French nuclear tests during the 1990s presents one example.30 Action directed at U.S. companies having no direct connection to global
warming because of the U.S. refusal to accept Kyoto present another.31 In other cases,
the target is implicated in the policy whose modification is sought. The continuing
boycott campaign against ExxonMobil relating to climate change fits into this category. ExxonMobil has been singled out both because of the impact of its own corporate policies on climate change (it, unlike Beaujolais wine, is part of the problem) and
because of its leverage in Washington. If ExxonMobil faces significant lost profits as
a result of U.S. non-participation in Kyoto,32 it could be expected to desist from its
support of the Bush administration’s refusal to pursue ratification of Kyoto. The campaign against ExxonMobil may have spurred other major oil companies to come out in
favor of the protocol.
In the face of economic globalization, this channel for securing governmental action should become more effective. When transnational corporations are the target,
this mechanism politically empowers non-state actors (individuals and organizations)
outside of the United States, typically in partnership with U.S. cohorts. A consumer
exercising choice at European pumps will be casting a sort of virtual vote in Washington. In the wake of successful consumer campaigns, moreover, transnational activist
groups wield power without resort to boycotts, actual or threatened; they have secured
what appear to be permanent seats at the table.33 Coupled with direct use of domestic
political channels, these entry points open up new opportunities for actors seeking to
advance U.S. participation in international institutions and compliance with international norms. If U.S. companies face lost business as a result of the Bush Administration’s unilateralist orientation, as they fear they will,34 they will work to change it.

30. See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the ‘Unregulated’
Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 960 (1996). More recently, the boycott of French wines among
Americans in the wake of France’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq, while not enough to turn around French
policy, was reported to have softened the French stance. See James Graff, Can France Put a Cork In It? With
the U.S. Boycott Hurting Wine Sales, Chirac Quiets Down and Tries to Make Nice, TIME, Apr. 28, 2003, at 42.
31. See Andrew Marshall, Boycott Targets Friends of Bush, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 20, 2001, at 6
(describing Kyoto-related boycotts directed at U.S. corporations like Coca-Cola, having nothing to do with
emissions activity).
32. See, e.g., Activists at the Gates: Whether They Like It or Not, Companies Cannot Afford to Ignore
Campaigning Groups, FIN. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at 12 (suggesting damage to ExxonMobil as a result of campaign).
33. See Alan Cowell, Advocates Gain Ground in a Globalized Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at C19
(reporting corporate perception of increased NGO power).
34. See Dire States, INDEPENDENT (London), July 17, 2003, at 2 (noting that the “[big] worry inside
boardrooms, from New York to Atlanta and Chicago, has been [whether] the unpopularity of George Bush’s
America—whether we are talking his attack on Iraq or his inaction on global warming—[will] impact on the
fundamental appeal of their brands in global markets”); Jeffrey E. Garten, Anger Abroad is Bad for Business,
BUS. WEEK, Nov. 10, 2003, at 30 (calling on “American CEOs [to] press Washington to change trade policies
that reinforce America’s image of arrogance and hypocrisy”); Stephen Fidler & Mark Huband, Bush Foreign
Policy “Is Creating Risks for US Companies,” FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at 13. But see Simon Romero, War
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This offers a more viable channel for applying pressure than has prevailed at the stateto-state level, where the costs of discipline will be high. Non-geopolitical channels
will present lower thresholds. The strategy is divide-and-conquer, both enabled and
generated by the disaggregating tendencies of globalization.
B. Non-State Norm Regimes
Equally significant is activism whose objective is to change the behavior of corporate or other non-state entities without securing the modification of governmental policy. This strategy is being deployed increasingly in the many contexts in which corporate or other non-governmental35 conduct is the source of a perceived harm. The
emergence of social responsibility and refined “voluntary” codes of conduct evidence
this trend toward advancing agendas outside of public institutions.36 Much of this activity has been occurring in the context of transnational corporate conduct, and much
of it has clear salience to international norms. Prominent examples are worker rights
and carbon emissions. With worker rights, competing codes of conduct have emerged
to set and monitor standards on such issues as child labor, minimum wages, and other
working conditions.37 Major manufacturers as well as important licensers, especially
universities, give these codes significant coverage.38 On emissions standards, environmental groups are securing commitments from some major energy corporations,

and Abuse Do Little Harm to U.S. Brands, N.Y. Times, May, 2004, § 1, at 1. As one observer put it, the decline
in U.S. brand power is
just an extension of the phenomenon we’ve already seen of people voting with their wallets on a
number of political issues. . . . [P]eople will factor in a guilt by association, so companies need to realise that the environments in which they are operating—and playing a part in shaping—can have an
impact on their bottom line. Companies need to revise their political lobbying strategies in the wake
of these kinds of findings. It is not enough for them to use their political clout to lobby for favours.
They will increasingly need to take a position on political [ ] as well as social and environmental issues in order that the consumer continues to support them.
Id. (quoting Noreena Hertz).
35. Including, for instance, religious organizations on such issues as the ordination of women or gays.
36. See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection, in
TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds.,
2003); Gary Gereffi et al., The NGO-Industrial Complex, FOR. POL’Y, July-Aug. 2001, at 125; Spiro, supra
note 30, at 958-62. The trend towards corporate codes of conduct has been coupled with the innovation of corporate “social reporting,” in which corporate practices relating to the environment, labor rights, human rights,
and other social practices are reported (and audited) parallel to traditional financial accountings. See Amy Cortese, The New Accountability: Tracking the Social Costs, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, § 3, at 4. Such reporting
is likely to impact corporate behavior even in the absence of externally devised codes of conduct.
37. See Alex Gourevitch, No Justice, No Contract: The Worker Rights Consortium Leads the Fight
AMERICAN
PROSPECT
ONLINE,
June
29,
2001,
available
at
Against
Sweatshops,
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root%name=ViewWeb&articleId=399 (describing differences
between two leading codes of conduct for the apparel industry, sponsored by the Fair Labor Association and the
Worker Rights Consortium); see generally Eliot J. Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights Through
Private Voluntary Initiatives: Public Relations or Public Policy? (2004), available at
http://www.uichr.org/content/act/sponsored/gwri_report.pdf (describing labor codes of conduct in various
global industries).
38. The Fair Labor Association includes such major producers and retailers as Eddie Bauer, Nike, Reebok,
Nordstrom, and Liz Claiborne. See http://www.fairlabor.org/all/companies/index.html. More than 125 colleges
and universities are affiliated with the Worker Rights Consortium, pursuant to which they agree to license their
logos only to manufacturers complying with the Consortium’s code of conduct.
See
http://www.workersrights.org/as.asp.
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including giants Shell and British Petroleum, to reduce their emissions of greenhouse
gases.39
Insofar as these initiatives succeed in changing target entity behavior, they diminish the importance of multilateral governmental action.40 Success is contingent on
coverage and effective monitoring (neither of which is seamless in any regulatory
scheme, public or private). Coverage is facilitated by competitive incentives within
industries and the risk of being stung by NGO “naming and shaming” boycott campaigns launched on a transnational basis.41 Though initial subscriptions to conduct
codes may be hard won for so long as a particular industry shows a united front, as
more entities within the targeted community sign on, the non-state equivalent of a
“norm cascade” or “tipping point” occurs, after which participation is voluntary in
name only.42 The establishment of conduct regimes advances international regimes
even in the absence of state participation. Every additional manufacturer signed on to
a worker rights code of conduct represents an incremental gain for international
worker rights. If all major energy producers reduced their greenhouse gas emissions,
that might represent a significant step toward accomplishment of the reduction set by
Kyoto, whether or not the protocol were to come into force. In other contexts, direct
action against other private actors could obviate altogether the need for U.S. governmental participation. International Relations theorists could not process this result in39. See JOSEPH F.C. DIMENTO, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 66, 69 (2003);
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Climate Change Activities in the United States: 2004 Update, at 21-50
(available at http://www.pewclimate.org /what_s_being_done/us_activities_2004.cfm) (documenting voluntary
corporate undertakings relating to global warming). Other examples of private regulatory regimes include labeling and certification schemes in the coffee, forest products, toy, and chemical industries. See generally Gereffi, supra note 36. In 2000, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan launched the UN Global Compact,
an undertaking in which more than 1500 corporations have directly subscribed (that is, in their own capacity
and not through home states) to nine principles relating to human rights, labor rights, and environmental protection. See The Global Compact, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org. Participating U.S. companies
include Amerada-Hess, Dupont, Nike, and Pfizer. Id.
40. See, e.g., A. Claire Cutler et al., The Contours and Significance of Private Authority in International
Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFF. 333, 369 (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999) (highlighting “the increasing relevance of the private sector in organizing the international system and increasingly in
establishing the rules of the game”); Karsten Ronit & Volker Schneider, Private Organizations and Their Contribution to Problem-Solving in the Global Arena, in PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 1, 18
(Karsten Ronit & Volker Schneider eds., 2000) (“[P]rivate organizations become alternatives to governance by
the state or governance by the market—and influence the ways in which public authority is exercised and economic exchanges are performed in the marketplace”).
41. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER 99 (2002) (noting the vulnerability of
multinationals to consumer campaigns). Notable examples of boycott efforts successful in securing changes in
corporate practices include those against Shell, for its proposed decommissioning in place of an offshore oil rig
(the Brent Spar episode), see, e.g., Nathaniel Nash, Oil Companies Face Boycott Over Sinking of Rig, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1995, § 1, at 3; against Nike, for its labor practices, see, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Rights Group
Scores Success With Nike, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2001, at C2; and against Starkist for practices endangering dolphins, see, e.g., Anthony Ramirez, From Coffee to Tobacco, Boycotts are a Growth Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 1990, §4, at 2. Threatened boycotts succeeded in securing the withdrawal of corporations doing business in
Burma. See Naomi Klein, Students Win the Pepsi Challenge, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 3, 1997, at A15 (describing
how Pepsi and other companies pulled out of Burma in the face of consumer activism). On increased negotiated resolution of NGO-corporate differences, see Living with the Enemy, ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2003, at 49;
Debora L. Spar & Lane T. LaMure, The Power of Activism: Assessing the Impact of NGOs on Global Business,
45 CAL. MGMT. REV. 78, 94 (2003) (“[I]t is clear . . . NGOs are increasingly focusing their powers of persuasion on firms and that firms, in turn, have become increasingly responsive.”)
42. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 9, at 895.
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sofar as they all aggregate the state for purposes of compliance. An aggregated approach may produce the conclusion that the “United States” is not participating in an
international regime when in fact much (or even all) of what comprises the United
States has signed on.43
Once major corporations are implicated in codes of conduct and similar regimes,
however, they have an incentive to press for their adoption as law. Corporate actors
seek certainty, even if certainty means entrenching norms that are costly over the short
term, and public law regimes promise greater certainty than do private ones.44 To the
extent that codes of conduct are pressed more effectively on large, multinational
manufacturers than on others, the lack of universality gives rise to competitive disadvantages.45 Those disadvantages can be corrected by universalizing norms generated
in the private scheme. The result will be corporate pressure for legalization. In the
U.S. context, this may mean pressing the U.S. government to accede to relevant international regimes. This was an important element in U.S. acceptance of international
accords limiting the use of CFCs.46 DeBeers was a crucial advocate of the Kimberley
Process and related U.S. legislation to address the problem of African blood diamonds.47 The CFC model could be repeated with respect to the Kyoto accords in the
context of greenhouse gases.48 To the extent that major energy concerns are being
held to Kyoto-like requirements as a result of activist pressure at the same time their
smaller counterparts slip under the radar screen, they can be expected to advocate U.S.

43. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, 1484 (2003) (noting that
the U.S. failure to accede to human rights treaties obscures near-complete compliance with obligations thereunder).
44. See Daniel Litvin, Needed: A Global Business Code of Conduct, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at
68 (calling for a U.N.-sponsored code of conduct: “[P]rominent firms have a strong incentive to create a global
set of rules by which all multinationals should play—a set of rules that is fair, realistic, and, above all, clear”);
Andrew C. Rivkin & Neela Banerjee, Some Energy Executives Urge U.S. Shift on Global Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at C1 (reporting that corporations “want the predictability that comes from quick adoption of clear rules,” even if it involves global regulation of emissions).
45. Possible exceptions could persist when a limited number of corporate players reduces the danger of
free riding. See Karsten Ronit, The Good, the Bad or the Ugly: Practices of Global Self-Regulation Among
Dyestuff Producers, in RONIT & SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 83, 89.
46. See RICHARD BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 30-33(1998).
47. See Robert I. Rotberg, Conflict Diamonds Aren’t Forever, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 25, 2001, at
9 (noting DeBeers support of Kimberley for fear of consumer boycott against diamond industry).
48. See Lucas Assunçao, Turning Its Back to the World? The United States and Climate Change Policy, in
UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 297, 298 (David M. Malone &
Yuen Foong Khong eds., 2003) (predicting “significant bottom-up pressure” by corporations for ratification);
William Drozdiak, U.S. Firms Become ‘Green Advocates,’ WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2000, at E1 (noting increasing number of large corporations supporting Kyoto: “[T]he shift in American business opinion could be decisive if and when the Senate votes on ratification of the Kyoto treaty”); Harold K. Jacobson, Climate Change:
Unilateralism, Realism, and Two-Level Games, in MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note
27, at 415, 429 (doubting that Kyoto will be adopted by the U.S. in present form, but still noting that “[o]ver
time the Senate might respond to pressure from U.S. businesses that are turning to support the agreement”); see
also, Govt to Ratify Kyoto Pact, DAILY YOMUIRI (Tokyo), Nov. 4, 2001, at 1 (reporting Japanese government
decision to ratify Kyoto in part because of “the risk of consumer boycotts of Japanese products in European and
other countries that support the protocol if Japan failed to move for ratification”). Corporate interests have also
been motivated to support these environmental protection accords insofar as they see an opportunity to reap
profits under the new regimes. See Assunçao, supra, at 311 (noting “tremendous opportunities for market expansion” by U.S. corporations in wake of Kyoto); Drozdiak, supra, at E1 (describing the electric utility’s support for Kyoto because of carbon credits for which it would be eligible under the treaty).
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support for the multilateral regime. In the meantime, the success of social responsibility campaigns dilutes the significance of current U.S. intransigence.
Unlike Constructivist models and their equivalents in the legal scholarship, this
descriptive analysis works from rational actor premises. Unlike Liberal IR Theory, it
allows for the transnational determination of “domestic” interests. The analysis is not
meant to dismiss the consequentiality of ideas, which at some level (not always primary) invariably figure in the success of efforts to secure adoption of an international
regime. But in confronting the massive power of the United States, it is important to
pose an interest-based scenario for the more complete integration of the United States
into international legal institutions. The plausibility of such integration is enhanced
by recognizing transnational in addition to intergovernmental and domestic political
determinants.
V
DISAGGREGATE AND CONQUER
The importance of causal pathways involving private actors is coupled with the
emergence of newly paved or widened pathways among governmental ones. These
include state and local governments, the courts, Congress, and executive agencies outside the traditional foreign policy apparatus. These governmental entry points can be
visited through both domestic and international channels. This disaggregation of governmental entities facilitates the incorporation of international law into U.S. practice
by lowering the pressure thresholds for institutional action and exploiting the institutional self-interest of disaggregated entities to participate in or conform with international regimes.
Liberal IR acknowledges—indeed it has foregrounded—the role of disaggregated
components of central governments.49 This work has been of breakthrough magnitude
in describing the actual conduct of international relations and posing a rich set of normative questions. On the theoretical side, it further undermines Realist conceptions of
unitary state actors. It is less clear how disaggregation fits into Liberal conceptions of
international relations. Liberal IR theorists stress the representative nature of disaggregated governmental entities, working from the premise that political preferences
within putative domestic society are prior. In effect, if Liberal theory generally poses
“the state as agent,” it appears to process disaggregated activity as “the agent of the
state as agent.”50 The liberal transnationalist analysis that follows, by contrast, high-

49. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L.
503, 505 (1995); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 11, 19 (2002).
50. See Moravcsik, supra note 8, at 519 (noting that disaggregated governmental elements can “conduct
semi-autonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal interests,” and “nonunitary state behavior
can be analyzed ‘as if’ it were unitary and rational.”); Slaughter, supra note 49, at 534 (noting that disaggregated “institutions operate in a dual regulatory and representative capacity with respect to individuals and
groups within society”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International
System, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 12, 28 (Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, eds., 2002) (“[Q]uasi-autonomous” action by governmental agencies at the international level “is not meant to suggest that these institutions do not represent
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lights the transnational determination of disaggregated governmental interests, that is,
how they are affected by forces that do not come under the umbrella of “domestic society.” The explanatory distinction may promise the facilitation of U.S. submission to
international regimes on a more accelerated basis than other theories would predict.
A. Subnational Actors
First of all, IR theorists appear to almost completely ignore the salience of substate
actors to international relations and the incorporation of international law, perhaps because their role is subversive of IR’s continued privileging of the state. But subfederal
jurisdictions in the United States now face weighty, discrete interests on the global
stage, interests that create leverage for international actors. The leverage may be exercised to advance international regimes. As I have written elsewhere, noncompliance with entrenched international law norms may result in lost economic opportunities for subnational units, crucial to economic prosperity in a globalized economy.51 Local jurisdictions in the United States are relatively fungible. International
actors can target resources away from jurisdictions thought to stand in violation of international norms. The approach increases leverage insofar as it can exploit inter-state
competition in a dynamic resembling consumer and shareholder action against corporations. (Indeed, it may include action against corporations that are identified with a
particular state by way of securing a change in state practices.) Although it would be
difficult to sanction the United States as a whole for non-compliance with an international law standard, it might be possible to single out particular subnational jurisdictions.
As with action against private actors, when subnational governmental conduct is
the ultimate object of a standard of conduct, securing action at that level will diminish
the significance of non-participation at the national level. If, for example, all states of
the United States are persuaded to modify death penalty practices (over which they
command almost complete responsibility) to comport with international standards,
then it makes less difference whether such persuasion succeeds in federal institutions.
B. Congress
Congress, executive branch agencies, and the courts also present discrete entry
points for international regimes. At the federal level, disaggregation creates fewer
competitive pressures, at least not on anything less than a national scale. It is more
costly to exercise economic leverage against the United States as a whole than against
territorial subunits or corporate elements. But transnational forces may nonetheless
prove increasingly influential with component parts of the federal government, resulting in more effectively applied pressures towards participation in international regimes.

their national interest, only that they represent a particular conception of national interest that is shaped by their
particular institutional/professional interests, values, and goals.”).
51. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 672
(2002); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1227 (1999).
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Congress remains most resistant to these forces. Its default position continues to
be one of non-participation. Congress has historically stood at the center of American
exceptionalism, and it will likely suffer exceptionalist tendencies into the future. But
it can be moved from these tendencies through the standard channels of legislative influence (money and votes), as in the international economic law context. Much of this
influence will be undertaken on behalf of identifiably domestic interests, including
U.S. citizens and corporations, thus appearing to fit neatly within the Liberal IR paradigm. But even these channels are no longer cleanly “American.” All publicly traded
corporations will now include foreign shareholders, and many will include other significant non-U.S. stakeholders. Many U.S. citizens hold additional citizenships in
other states.52 And these elements, even if dominantly American, can be the agents of
transnational influence, as when U.S. corporations face the sort of transnational consumer pressure described above.
More clearly outside the “domestic” box are campaign contributions by resident
aliens and the wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations.53 Foreign corporations are independently active lobbyists on the Hill, where they can exercise influence by delivering information, if not dollars.54 This activity will tend to support
participation in international regimes insofar as such regimes benefit foreign entities
in the U.S. and global context. Progress may lag in contexts lacking corporate advocates. It will be especially difficult to budge Congress on meaningful participation in
human rights regimes, on which the most intense contemporary manifestations of
modern American exceptionalism have focused, from the Bricker Amendment episode
forward.55 As Liberal IR theorists have highlighted, the structure of Congress creates
minority veto opportunities, and those opportunities will continue to be exercised in
the international human rights context. To the extent that domestic interests mobilize
in support of participation, one could expect an evolution in practice towards participation. The change would be accelerated if U.S. corporate interests began to face related transnational activist pressure along the lines of the “innocent bystander” model
sketched above. Action broadly equating U.S. corporate activity with U.S. nonparticipation in human rights regimes remains a long way over the horizon. But one
can construct scenarios in which Congress becomes more institutionally amenable to
pressure to participate in international human rights and other non-economic international regimes.

52. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411
(1997) (describing the implications of the growing incidence of plural citizenship).
53. See, e.g., Carter Dougherty, The American Way: German Firm Chooses Charity to Have Impact on
Capitol Hill, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at C7 (reporting a contribution involving the purchase of wheat
from North Dakota, represented by the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee).
54. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, Guardian Angel in U.S. Watches Over Foreign Groups, FIN. TIMES, May 3,
2000, at 13 (describing a lobbying group established to further the interests of foreign subsidiaries in the United
States).
55. See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE (1990) (describing history of legislative resistance to human rights regimes).

10_SPIRO_FMT.DOC

Autumn 2004]

2/16/2005 9:35 AM

U.S. INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

213

C. Executive Branch Agencies
Closer to the core of disaggregation theory, executive branch agencies beyond the
traditional foreign policy apparatus now have institutional incentives to incorporate
international legal regimes. Though this incorporation is largely out of the public eye,
it points to the globalization of regulatory activity. The emergence of transnational
government networks are at the leading edge of disaggregation. The U.S. nodes of
these networks comprise another discrete entry point for international law. Here, too,
are transnational determinants of institutional interests that should point to increased
U.S. participation in international regimes over the long run. Although agencies cannot be directly plied with contributions, foreign entities can supply them with information. Especially when coordinated with U.S.-based entities,56 these deliverables can
affect outcomes.57 Regulatory constituencies are likely to be transnational, even if
they are not organized as such. For instance, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission now protects a significant number of foreign shareholders in U.S.-based corporations. Insofar as SEC regulatory effectiveness is contingent on global harmonization, one could expect that transnational constituency to press both U.S. and foreign
regulators to undertake regulatory coordination. That the resulting regime is largely
(though not completely) of the SEC’s devise does not render it representative only of
U.S. interests. The transnational constituencies will press for the adoption of transnational regulatory regimes.
The regulators will have a strong independent interest in coordinated action in
that, in an increasing number of regulatory spaces, regulation will be ineffective if undertaken on a domestic territorial basis only.58 Together, these forces should lead
component elements of the federal executive branch to buy into transnational regimes.
Although a U.S. regulator will often be the most powerful player in a transgovernmental network, even when the regulator dominates, the process of coordination will involve compromises. As adopted by the United States, then, the harmonized regime—
whatever the vehicle, a form of international law—will comprise an incorporation of
international law standards. As disaggregated from the central organs of foreign policy, agencies pose another entry point for international law.
D. The Judiciary
Even though they are not directly subject to interest-based politics, federal judges
and the courts are also developing institutional interests that point toward greater ori-

56. For an example, see Letter from the [U.S.] National Foreign Trade Council, Confederation of British
Industry, Federation of German Industries, & E.U. Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Belgium, to Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative & Pascal Lamy, E. Trade Commissioner, (May 13,
2003), available at http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/final%20changes%20to%20joint%20association%20
letter%20on%20DDA1.pdf (urging joint U.S.-E.U. action to advance Doha Round trade negotiations).
57. See, e.g., Maria Green Cowles, The Transatlantic Business Dialogue: Transforming the New Transatlantic Dialogue, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 213 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001) (describing impact of concerted lobbying activity by U.S. and E.U. corporate elements).
58. See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52
EMORY L.J. 1353, 1355 (2003).
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entation to international law standards. In the context of life tenure, judges may be
more focused on reputational standing. As domestic courts come increasingly to identify themselves as part of a global community of courts,59 this interest should open up
the courts as an additional entry point for international law.
Federal judges may now define their peer group to include foreign and international jurists, as a result of increasingly structured contacts with those counterparts.
This identification gives U.S. judges an incentive to act in a way that will enhance
their reputation with those groups. The incentive can play out at the level of individual contact; judges will naturally want to garner respect rather than opprobrium when
they find themselves, on a repeat basis, interacting with non-U.S. judges.60 To the extent that judging involves dialogue among courts—with citation frequencies as a
measurement of both individual and institutional reputation61—federal judges may
come increasingly to value the attention of foreign and international tribunals.
On both counts, the interests of federal judges will be served by the deployment of
international law norms. Recognition is, first of all, a two-way street, especially
among those who are not assigned a formal hierarchical relationship. Foreign and international tribunals are more likely to take notice of U.S. judicial decisions to the extent U.S. judges take notice of them. Second, U.S. jurists have lagged in their comfort
with and use of comparative and international law sources relative to their non-U.S.
counterparts. In the context of twentieth-century America, that was never a problem;
indeed, it may have been a badge. Today, U.S. judges may be more responsive to the
harsh critiques launched by global jurists highlighting the failure of U.S. courts to take
account of international law.62
This amenability to international law sources is being reinforced among domestic
audiences. Litigants are coming increasingly to cite international law sources to U.S.
courts; gone are the days when litigants resorted to international legal authority because none was to be had among domestic sources. Leading U.S. legal academics, including some who would identify themselves as constitutional rather than international law scholars (another group with which many judges will seek to build
reputational capital), are asserting the salience of international and foreign law to the
task of judging domestically.63 Federal judges now enjoy significant backup support
as they begin to shed their blinders. But that support is itself far from indigenous, for
it will have been transnationally generated. Litigants and law professors are them-

59. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. J. INT’L L. 191 (2003).
60. See Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Opening Up to World Opinion, LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2003, at 1 (describing how justices’international travel may have affected their approach to citing international authority).
61. Cf. RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 71 (1989) (correlating historical standing
of judges to citation frequency).
62. See, e.g., Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 27 (1998) (a Canadian jurist criticizing the Rehnquist Court
for failing to account sufficiently for international norms).
63. It is particularly significant that it is not only international law theorists who are pressing the use of
international sources in domestic judging. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999) (noting that the constitutional experiences of other nations may assist
the Supreme Court in interpreting the U.S. Constitution); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting
the Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J., 353 (2004).
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selves increasingly situated in transnational spaces and being buffeted by transnational
forces.
Long emerging, these influences are showing results in U.S. judicial decisionmaking. Opinions in two important recent Supreme Court decisions have adverted to international norms. The majority in Atkins v. Virginia noted the near-global consensus
against executing the mentally retarded.64 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court highlighted
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and other nations on the way to
striking down a state measure criminalizing homosexual sodomy.65 One might expect
to see a growing number of cases in which majority opinions from the Court cite international law sources as support. Such deployment of international and foreign law
may continue to draw ferocious dissents66 and scattered other opposition.67 The possibility of provoking anti-internationalist elements in Congress, which would have some
capacity to fight the practice, will likely find the Court treading lightly for now. But
the trend toward the judicial incorporation of international norms is unlikely to be reversed.
As the state is disaggregated and made permeable to discrete international activity,
these actors beyond the foreign policy organs of the central government will render
the United States vulnerable to the imposition of international norms. As permeability
broadens, actors whose interests will be served through international norms will be afforded multiple strategic opportunities denied them in the era of highly channeled
state-to-state relations. The United States is no longer a monolith for purposes of international law and relations; it is now, rather, an arena in which global forces can
play at the game of transnational politics and rational institutional action.
That is not to say that traditional, aggregated models of state action all reject the
possibility of more complete U.S. participation in international regimes. Longestablished models of international relations working from standard statist geopolitical
premises and focusing on the White House and traditional foreign policy agencies, including State, Defense, and Treasury, still apply on a non-exclusive basis, and in an
increasing number of contexts implicate international law. To the extent that other
states press an international law agenda on the United States, the traditional foreign
policy apparatus may have cause to accept international legal regimes that it would
otherwise reject. Assuming rational decisionmaking, it all depends on what is on the
table; if the cost of the action threatened by the other state outweighs the benefit of

64. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (bolstering a finding of national consensus on the issue by noting that
“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”).
65. 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
66. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. . at 598, (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“This Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he
viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant”); id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Equally irrelevant are
the practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”); see also Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1119 (1996).
67. See, e.g., Courting Foreign Ideas, Justices Set a Troubling Precedent in Considering Other Nations’
Rulings, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, July 11, 2003, at 8B (editorial); see also H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004)
(expressing sense of House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of
the United States should not be based on judgments of foreign institutions).
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nonparticipation in the regime, then one would expect a change in the U.S. posture
toward the regime.
Such discipline has been difficult to apply because the United States looms so
powerful and because other states have been unwilling to expend significant resources
to back international law when it does not promise direct payoffs. But some examples
may appear over the horizon. In the post-9/11 context, for example, European states
have been turning up the heat on the Guantanamo detentions in such a way as to secure action consistent with their view of applicable human rights standards. Left to its
own devices, the United States would likely continue the detentions indefinitely (or at
least so long as the terrorist threat persisted), affording the detainees no process of any
kind. The detentions have generated growing opposition among other states. European states may threaten to withhold important cooperation along other fronts in the
war on terrorism if the detentions persist without process. That could tip the balance
in favor of proceedings (military or otherwise).68 Insofar as compliance here would
require proceedings rather than release, the cost of compliance will be relatively low.
It is possible that a similar equation will emerge with respect to the use of military
commissions in place of ordinary criminal proceedings. Given that this, too, involves
a matter of process rather than result, it is possible that foreign-state pressure could be
consequential, and that only minimal use will be made of the military commission option.
VI
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Interest-based explanations for a trajectory toward more complete participation by
the United States in international regimes apply in the realm of constitutional as well
as ordinary law. I assume, as do others, the constitutional consequence of actors beyond the federal courts. If all states of the Union barred the execution of juvenile offenders, that would be of constitutional significance even if the Supreme Court had
not so dictated.69 If the Drug Enforcement Agency accedes to the demands of other
states that it comport with procedural mandates of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights when undertaking enforcement actions on their territory, that may
effectively override the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to non-citizens located outside the United States.70 If Congress deems a treaty
regime consistent with the Constitution, that may be the last word on the subject; even
if it is not, the institutional position will weigh heavily with any court considering the
question. As is now being recognized in the historical domestic context, the positions

68. For an elaboration, see Peter J. Spiro, Realizing Constitutional and International Norms in the Wake of
September 11, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME (Mark Tushnet ed., forthcoming 2004).
69. The Court itself would find such a state practice salient to the definition of federal constitutional standards insofar as it reflected a national consensus. Even those justices who resist the use of international sources
would thus have no choice but to recognize them.
70. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (finding Fourth Amendment not applicable to search of non-citizen’s residence outside the United States).
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of private actors such as social movements may figure as constitutionally consequential.71
Through these non-judicial channels, then, the Constitution is likely to be increasingly entangled in the tentacles of international norms. As a formal matter, of course,
the Constitution will remain supreme. However deeply the courts drink from international waters, for example, it will ostensibly be for interpretative purposes only: it
would be constitutional nonsense, at least in the face of persistent constitutional nationalism, to deem international norms constitutionally constraining.72 But the formal
subordination of international sources may mask their growing constitutional consequence. Even though many cases will involve choices between domestically and internationally established norms, few cases will present an inescapable conflict between them. International norms can thus be adopted under cover of constitutional
supremacy. To the extent that institutional interests point to acceptance of norms as
determined at the international level, institutions will orient themselves accordingly.
This trend will be most obviously detected at the Supreme Court, but is also likely to
ramify through the full spectrum of disaggregated governmental entities.
That is emphatically not to say that all constitutional law will be made at the international level. These trends remain in their embryonic stages, dating roughly to the
end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. International law itself remains
in a state of institutional ferment; the interpretative function of many institutions remains in flux. Substantive law also remains highly unstable. These observations hold
true even in the area of international human rights, of greatest salience to domestic
constitutional law. The so-called treaty committees, for instance, may emerge as definitive interpreters of the human rights conventions, especially as an increasing number of states-party accept their jurisdiction over cases initiated by individuals; in the
meantime, however, their status remains contested.73 The substantive coverage of the
human rights agreements is both broad and deep, but refinement through application
remains thin. The scope of customary norms (that is, those established outside of
treaty relationships), especially those qualifying as jus cogens (customary norms from
which states may not opt out), is also in flux. In the short term, there will be few cases
in which domestic constitutional decisionmakers are visibly constrained by international constitutional standards.
Even in the long term, there will be considerable room for the exercise of constitutional autonomy. As in the U.S. federal system, rights can in some cases be adjusted

71. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2001) (“The modern meaning of the Equal Protection Clause owes much more to the
power and norms of the civil rights and women’s liberation movements than to the original intent of the 14th
Amendment framers.”).
72. As those pressing the use of international sources are themselves careful to note. See, e.g., Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Obviously this foreign authority does not bind us. After all, we are interpreting a ‘Constitution for the United States of America.’”).
73. Compare Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 337-67 (1997) (describing increasing efficacy of the Human Rights Committee charged with interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) with Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 399, 463-64
(2000) (questioning Committee’s authority).
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to local conditions. In the terms of international law, these possibilities are reflected
in the doctrines of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. An appropriate candidate for such treatment vis-à-vis the United States, for example, might emerge in the
First Amendment context. This will create further space for maintaining formal constitutional supremacy, even for reconciling American exceptionalism with hardening
human rights norms.74 And when domestic constitutional norms are changed to conform with international ones, the move will invariably be overdetermined, attributable
to domestic forces as well as transnational ones. That may further obscure the infiltration of international law.
Below the surface, however, U.S. constitutional decisionmaking may nonetheless
be increasingly constrained by internationally determined standards. Some international norms will harden, supported by something approaching an international consensus, cases in which it will be difficult to argue the law, as it were. Some will not
be amenable to local variation. Finally, in some cases the impact of international
norms will be difficult to disguise. The death penalty context may prove such a case
on all three points. The trajectory towards abolitionism is clear; it is one that, once established, will allow for no derogation; and when the United States falls into line (to
the extent federal compliance means anything, in the wake of conformed conduct at
the state level), the impact of the international standards will almost surely be identifiable. At the macro level, the level of U.S. participation in international institutions
and conformity with international standards will likely rise, the bluster of the present
Administration notwithstanding. If so, that will further demonstrate the value of the
model proposed here for thinking about the interplay of U.S. and international law.
VII
CONCLUSION
Existing models of international law and international relations are ill-equipped to
project the more complete assimilation of the United States into international norm regimes. On the one hand, norm-driven theories fail to explain how international actors
will overcome entrenched U.S. resistance to international lawmaking. The United
States does not require the approbation of other states by way of maintaining a sense
of national legitimacy. On the other hand, rationalist theories systematically underestimate the incentives that the United States may have for buying into international regimes. By segregating interests and actors along national lines, these models miss
transnational accelerents of international norms. The interests of the full spectrum of
U.S. actors—disaggregated governmental and private entities—are increasingly determined in transnational political spaces. Transnationality affords non-domestic actors enhanced leverage in pressing U.S. participation in international regimes. By this
model the United States could be more fully drawn into international law as a matter
of rational institutional action.
Constitutional law will not be immune to these developments. Judges and other
constitutional actors will face incentives to incorporate international norms in their
74. See Koh, supra note 43, at 1483.
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constitutional decisionmaking. To the extent that the Constitution becomes transnationally determined, self-determination will be limited, not only in law making but
also, in the American case, in sustaining a distinctive national identity. This by itself
is something to be neither lamented nor valorized. But the prospect should draw
greater attention to the global institutions in which increasingly consequential norms
are being contested and generated.

